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An increasing variety of budgetary positions, with challenging overall developments  
Actual deficits continued to increase in 2003 throughout the EU, reflecting the protracted 
slowdown in growth and the working of automatic stabilisers. In the euro area, the deficit rose 
from 2.3% of GDP in 2002 to 2.7% of GDP in 2003. If all 25 countries which are members of 
the EU as of 1 May 2004 are taken into account, the deficit has increased from 2.1% to 2.7% 
of GDP. Cyclically-adjusted developments have started to evolve more favourably, improving 
from 2.4% of GDP in 2002 to 2.1% in 2003. However, this reflects sizeable one-off measures 
in several countries. 
With eight countries in surplus and eleven with deficits above 3% in 2003, the EU by 
enlarging to 25 members sees the variety of budgetary performances across Member States 
increase. The most significant deficits are those of Germany and France, given the size both 
of the countries themselves and of their deficits, which heavily affect the overall outcome of 
the euro area. The situation in Italy, where the deficit stayed below 3% only by dint of 
sizeable one-off measures, is also a matter of concern given its high government debt-to-GDP 
ratios. Outside the euro area, actual balances deteriorated in a number of countries, including 
the UK and Poland. In contrast with these developments, Spain, Belgium, Ireland, Finland 
and Luxembourg (in the euro area) and Sweden, Denmark, Estonia in the EU-25 recorded 
surpluses which were maintained throughout the slowdown, attesting to the soundness of their 
budgetary positions. Reflecting the budgetary and growth developments in large countries, the 
government debt-to-GDP ratio increased in 2003 to reach 70.4% in the euro area and 63.1% 
in the EU-25. Here too, situations are quite diverse, with Italy, Greece and Belgium having a 
government debt-to-GDP ratio above 100% and 14 countries with debt levels well below 60% 
of GDP. 
Sound public finances will not be achieved in the near future in some countries 
In spite of an improving growth outlook, budgetary prospects for 2004 and 2005 are not very 
promising. Both the actual and cyclically-adjusted budget balances of the euro area, according 
to the Commission Spring 2004 forecasts, are projected to be broadly unchanged in 2004 and, 
on an unchanged policy basis, in 2005. At EU-25 level, the actual balance is projected to 
improve marginally to 2.5% of GDP in 2005. The public debt-to-GDP ratio is projected to 
increase slightly in 2004 to 70.9% of GDP in the euro area and to 63.4% in the EU-25, and to 
remain at the same level in both areas in 2005. At country level, the deficit is projected by the 
Commission to remain above 3% of GDP in 2004 in both France and Germany,. The two 
Member States are committed to bring the deficit below 3% in 2005. The deficit is also 
expected to be above 3% in 2004 in Greece, the Netherlands, and, if the expiry of one-offs is 
not compensated by corrective measures, also in Portugal and Italy. The budgetary situation 
in most new Member States is expected to improve over the next two years. 
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The latest updates of the stability and convergence programmes show that a close-to-balance 
position in cyclically-adjusted terms will not be reached in several countries by 2007 (-0.7% 
of GDP for the euro area). Germany, France, Portugal and the UK in particular will still be far 
from a balanced budget at that point. This means that there will be an inadequate safety 
margin to prevent a breach of the 3%-of-GDP reference value in the event of adverse 
economic conditions. In addition, the medium-term objectives of some euro-area Member 
States are based on growth assumptions which appear to be overly optimistic. Even if the 
growth rates expected in the updates were realised, the budgetary targets seem difficult to 
reach. The new Member States foresee in their convergence programmes an ambitious 
consolidation of their public finances.  
Considering that the implementation record of the programmes has, in several cases, been 
poor – which has led to a repeated postponement of the achievement of the close-to-balance 
objective – it is clear that there is no reason for complacency. It is vital for Member States to 
reach budget positions which ensure that the automatic stabilisers work freely, and decrease 
the risk of unsustainable public finances in the light of ageing populations, and if the 
composition of the adjustment is right, would contribute to achieving over the next few years 
the Lisbon objectives of high growth and employment rates. Past experience shows that 
significant efforts to improve the underlying budget positions should be undertaken as 
economic conditions improve: the difficulties experienced in respecting the Treaty 
requirements in 2002 and 2003 reflect also the fact that countries did not make enough fiscal 
adjustment during the good times in 1999 and 2000. 
Increasing activation of the procedures for budgetary surveillance 
By mid-2003, the number of countries placed in an excessive deficit position increased to 
three, with France joining Portugal and Germany. In spite of the measures taken by France 
and Germany, it soon became evident that deficits in these two countries, in contrast to 
Portugal, would remain high in 2003, and that the probability of bringing them below 3% of 
GDP by the deadline of 2004 was very low in the light of the draft budgets submitted in the 
autumn 2003. The Commission therefore moved forward with the excessive deficit procedure 
with the aim of urging France and Germany to take more decisive measures in order to correct 
their deficits at least by 2005. In spring 2004, following the notification of budgetary data 
concerning 2003, the Commission started the procedures for Greece, the Netherlands and the 
United Kingdom, which registered deficits above 3% of GDP in 2003. At the same time, 
given that the deficit remained below 3% of GDP in 2003, the Commission proposed to repeal 
the decisions placing Portugal in a position of excessive deficit. On the basis of its forecasts, it 
recommended that an ‘early warning’ be addressed to Italy, given the substantial risk of 
breaching the 3%-of-GDP reference value in 2004. The Commission started the excessive 
deficit procedure for several new Member States following their accession to the EU. 
Recommendations will be made to these countries to help pursue a credible multi-annual 
adjustment path. 
Tensions in the implementation of the fiscal framework led to uncertainty 
While the procedures foreseen by the Treaty were used smoothly in the run-up to EMU, since 
the birth of the euro their implementation has become more difficult. In February 2002, the 
Commission recommended that the Council adopt an ‘early warning’ addressed to Germany 
and Portugal. On that occasion, the Council did not follow the Commission’s proposals, on 
account of commitments made by these countries. Similarly, but at a more advanced stage in 
the procedures, the Council at the end of November of 2003 did not endorse the 
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Commission’s recommendations concerning France and Germany, which extended by one 
year the deadline for correcting the situation of excessive deficit and implied advancing with 
the procedures.  
The tensions which have arisen in the implementation of the procedures of the Treaty and the 
SGP, and the diverging interpretation of the latter by the Community institutions, have 
created uncertainty as to how budgetary surveillance should be conducted. They have also 
shown that certain elements of the framework should be reconsidered in order to increase both 
its effectiveness and its credibility. 
In response to the difficulties in implementing the fiscal framework, the Commission 
announced a strategy aimed at seeking legal clarity on the provisions of the Treaty and the 
SGP, continuing budgetary surveillance, and considering what steps are needed to strengthen 
economic governance. Accordingly, at the end of January 2004 the Commission asked the 
European Court of Justice to annul the decisions taken by the Council and the Conclusions 
adopted at its November meeting. The Court has decided to handle the case in an accelerated 
procedure.  
Meanwhile, in line with its strategy, the Commission continued to conduct budgetary 
surveillance in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty and the SGP. This involved 
assessing the 2003 updates of the stability and convergence programmes and preparing draft 
Opinions for the Council. The Commission also updated the BEPGs including new country-
specific budgetary recommendations for 7 countries. It also moved ahead with the procedures 
for countries not running sound budgetary policies, and also pursued its efforts to improve the 
quality of surveillance. At the same time, it started to reflect on how the framework could be 
rejuvenated in order to tackle the shortcomings which have manifested themselves in the first 
years of EMU.  
Analytical improvements made within the framework for EU budgetary surveillance 
The Report on Public Finances in EMU – 2004 highlights four areas where progress has been 
made in the analysis of budgetary developments, including on (i) the role of one-off measures 
for the assessment of budgetary positions, (ii) the use of cyclically-adjusted balances for the 
assessment of the efforts countries have made, (iii) the assessment of the long-term 
sustainability of public finances, and (iv) the surveillance of contingent liabilities. 
The increased focus of multilateral surveillance on more structural factors calls for temporary 
changes in budgetary positions to be clearly identified, particularly when they are due either 
to the implementation of budgetary measures with only temporary effects or to the economic 
cycle.  
(i) Among the sources of temporary changes in budgets, ‘one-off’ measures taken by 
governments warrant particular attention because they are becoming a frequent and sizeable 
feature in EU countries. It is therefore important to take account of such measures and the 
reasons behind them in the surveillance process. This calls for greater transparency of budget 
measures and a clearer reporting of these measures by Member States, including in the 
stability and convergence programmes.   
(ii) A common methodology which provides figures for the cyclically-adjusted budget 
balances (CABs) is used at EU level to disentangle changes in the budget which reflect the 
economic cycle from those which do not, the latter reflecting measures decided by policy-
makers. The CABs have proved to be a very useful instrument for assessing the Member 
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States’ budgetary policies. However, the CABs may not reflect discretionary fiscal adjustment 
efforts entirely correctly. Unexpected changes in potential output can also have an impact on 
the results. The solution proposed is a simple correction of CABs figures, excluding the small 
component of the change attributable to unexpected changes in potential growth.  
(iii) In 2004, for the third year in a row, the EU budgetary surveillance includes an assessment 
of the long-term sustainability of public finances on the basis of the updated stability and 
convergence programmes. This year greater attention has been devoted to increase the 
qualitative analysis supporting the interpretation of the results obtained, which has 
significantly contributed to giving the assessment a higher information value. Overall, the 
analysis shows that risks to long-term sustainability are still present in nine countries. In five 
of them (Belgium, Greece, Italy, Germany and France) the difficulties are more serious, while 
the others face some risks due either to medium-term budgetary developments (Netherlands 
and the UK) or to the uncertainties over the long-term projections of pension expenditures 
(Spain and Portugal). Finally, six countries (Ireland, Denmark, Finland, Austria, Luxembourg 
and Sweden) seem relatively well placed to meet the cost of an ageing society on the basis of 
current policies. 
(iv) To get a comprehensive picture of the sustainability of public finances, liabilities other 
than those included in the Maastricht definition of gross debt should be considered. Among 
them are the so-called ‘contingent liabilities’, which correspond to government obligations 
that materialise only when particular events occur. The importance of this issue in EU 
budgetary surveillance has increased over the last years and in particular after enlargement. 
The stock of contingent liabilities is in fact relatively high in new Member States. Given the 
various situations and trends in the EU, increasing disclosure and monitoring of contingent 
liabilities would be a useful step towards strengthening budgetary surveillance in the EU. 
Budgetary discipline and increased growth potential are consistent objectives 
The EU budgetary rules aim at promoting medium- and long-term budgetary discipline so as 
to ensure sound budgetary positions. However, the EU framework has been criticised for 
focusing too much on disciplinary aspects, thereby not being growth-friendly. Against this 
background, the Report on Public Finances in EMU - 2004 looks at the questions of how 
fiscal discipline and the quality of public finances contribute to growth.  
The benefits of fiscal discipline 
During the tense debate which took place last year about the implementation of the EU 
framework for fiscal surveillance, many critics stressed that it imposes an excessive focus on 
fiscal discipline and that this has been detrimental to growth. However, these criticisms are 
ill-founded. Without the progress towards fiscal discipline accomplished in the past decade 
thanks to the rules-based framework, the European economy would probably have an even 
more disappointing growth performance. The Report on Public Finance in EMU – 2004 
shows that, rather than being at the expense of growth, fiscal discipline and sound public 
finances contribute to a macroeconomic environment that fosters potential growth. A fiscal 
framework, by preventing protracted fiscal deficits, avoids the negative impact which such 
deficits have on future income.   
The mechanism at work is quite straightforward. When deficits are protracted, a reduction in 
national savings will follow. In turn, this translates either into a reduction in private 
investment, or into a worsening of the current account, or both. The extent of private 
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investment crowding-out will depend upon the sensitivity of national savings to interest rates 
and the degree of international capital mobility, while the behaviour of government 
investment will mainly depend upon the allocation of total expenditure and the extent to 
which deficits are used to finance current or capital expenditure. The real issue, then, is not 
whether a loss of fiscal discipline will translate over the medium term into lower future 
incomes but by how much and through which channels. 
Protracted budget deficits primarily reduce capital accumulation and income prospects, 
mainly via higher interest rates. The Report on Public Finance in EMU – 2004 shows, in line 
with empirical evidence, that an additional deficit of one percentage point of GDP in euro-
area countries is on average associated with an increase in the spread in the interest rate 
between long and short-term government bonds of 15-20 basis points. Although small, this 
increase is likely to have negative effects on investment, which is influenced by long-term 
interest rates, among other factors.  
In addition, the analysis suggests that protracted large budget imbalances in countries with 
high current account deficits may be a cause of delay in the external adjustment. This concern 
is of especial importance for new Member States, most of which have in recent years been 
recording relatively large budget deficits coupled with external imbalances. Though the latter 
may be explained by catching-up dynamics, keeping budget deficits under control will be 
essential in order to maintain stable currencies within ERM-II as a necessary step towards 
joining EMU. 
In the debate about the EU fiscal framework, little analysis has been conducted on the 
quantitative impact that the presence of the framework has exerted on budget balances in EU 
countries. Simulations with the European Commission QUEST II model indicate that, in the 
absence of the EU fiscal framework, primary budget deficits for the euro area would have 
been higher by almost 0.9 GDP points per year over the 1994-2003 period. This suggests that 
the EU fiscal framework has contributed to avoiding a sizeable build-up of euro-area 
government debt, which in 2003 would have been about 8 GDP percentage points higher than 
now. Furthermore, the simulations suggest that higher deficits in the euro area would have 
initially increased the income level by at most half a percentage point of GDP, but this small 
effect would have faded away quickly. However, taking into account the impact of debt on 
risk premia, results indicate that the gains from an absence of fiscal discipline would have 
been even smaller in the short run and negative in the medium term.  
Overall, the analysis suggests that the budgetary adjustment in the 1990s induced by the EU 
fiscal framework implied a reduction in growth of limited magnitude and duration but laid the 
foundations for better growth prospects. In the absence of the framework, higher deficits 
would have crowded out private investment and further reduced potential growth compared 
with current figures. 
Improving the quality of public finances 
In view of the importance attached by the Lisbon strategy to the quality of public finances, 
reflected in the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines (BEPGs) as well as in other process such 
as the Employment Guidelines and the Open Method of Coordination, the Report on Public 
Finances in EMU – 2004 endeavours to clarify the role of the quality of public finances 
within the EU framework for economic policy co-ordination and investigate possibilities for 
improving the quality of public finances in practice.  
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Generally accepted definitions of quality are not available. The Report uses a broad concept, 
whereby quality of public finances concerns the allocation of resources and the efficient and 
effective use of those resources in relation to identified strategic priorities. Regarding the 
latter, for instance the EU Lisbon strategy identifies sustainable growth, full employment, 
social cohesion and competitiveness as strategic priorities. A full discussion addressing the 
quality of public finances with respect to all these aims is beyond the scope of the Report. 
Therefore, as a starting point for further and more complete analysis and while recognising 
the partial nature of such exercise, it mainly focuses on the link between fiscal policy and 
long term growth. Accordingly, the Report starts by reviewing the recent literature on the link 
between the composition of expenditure and revenue and long-term growth. The findings of 
existing studies confirm the importance of taking into account both the costs (i.e. higher 
taxation) and benefits (i.e. reaching policy objectives) of public spending. The major 
difficulties that empirical studies have encountered concern the distinction between 
‘productive’ and ‘unproductive’ expenditure. Although there is a certain degree of agreement 
that a few categories of public expenditure can quite safely be included among ‘productive’ 
public expenditures because they are directly aimed at productivity improvements (e.g. R&D, 
education and infrastructure investment) there is no consensus among researchers concerning 
the impact of most expenditure items on long-term growth and its timing. This lack of 
consensus is reflected by the fact that available estimates of ‘productive’ expenditure in the 
EU range between 5% and 44% of total public expenditure. 
In the light of these difficulties, the analysis of the composition of public expenditure across 
EU countries focuses on what the changes in the compositions have been and what factors 
drive these changes. Generally, over the last decade social protection and health care 
expenditure increased their share in total expenditure, while the latter expressed as a share of 
GDP has gone down. This suggests that the main drivers of expenditure recomposition over 
the medium-/long-term are related to underlying upward pressures such as those resulting 
from ageing and that any framework for the definition of strategic expenditure priorities must 
take such long-term trends into account.  
In recent years, several Member States have introduced medium-term frameworks for 
expenditure control and reforms to the budgetary process that aim at achieving priorities in 
the most efficient and effective way by linking public expenditure to policy outcomes 
(performance budgeting). The analysis shows that, in countries with more effective control of 
public expenditure, fiscal consolidation in the run-up to EMU has been mainly based on 
containing expenditure, rather than on raising revenues, thereby contributing to a better long-
run growth performance.  
Overall, this analysis implies that the allocation of resources and the monitoring of action 
undertaken to pursue identified priorities should have a greater role in the analysis and 
conduct of fiscal policy. To this end, the BEPGs should contribute more effectively, as well as 
other EU processes, to improve the quality of public finances.  
Progress should include, first, the exchange of information on how strategic priorities have 
been fixed with respect to national budgets and what the experiences with implementing them 
have been. Second, further improvements in data availability are needed – in particular 
regarding the functional classification of government expenditure – since this is a necessary 
condition for an appropriate analysis of the contribution of public finances to agreed 
priorities. Third, a proper design and implementation of medium-term expenditure 
frameworks and progress in cost-benefit analysis and performance budgeting would help to 
improve both the control and allocation of existing funds.  
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Finally, a contribution to the quality of public finances can be given by the Union’s Initiative 
for Growth, through which the European Council has established a roadmap for increased 
investment at EU scale in physical and human capital to complement structural reform. 
Serious engagement by the EU institutions and Member States is required in order to ensure 
that financially and economically viable projects of major relevance are undertaken in a 
sustained and timely way. 
Strengthening the EU framework for economic governance 
In 2003, the need for further and more decisive progress in the EU framework for economic 
governance was highlighted by the difficulties in maintaining budgetary discipline and by the 
persistently low growth. In spite of important advances made in budgetary surveillance, 
further efforts are needed to improve the quality of public finances and ensure fiscal 
discipline. In particular, a number of issues that have arisen with the implementation of the 
EU framework for economic coordination and fiscal surveillance deserve further attention as 
dealing with them may strengthen the contribution of public finances to growth and 
employment.  
First, the processes underlying the coordination of economic policies in the EU have proven 
ineffective at times and the EU coordination framework for economic policy has been 
perceived as focusing almost exclusively on achieving and maintaining balanced budgets. 
This may be due to the weak link between the guidelines provided on economic policies and 
those on fiscal policy (i.e. the links between the BEPGs and the Pact) and to the different 
levels of stringency of the two processes. This weak link between the two processes makes it 
more difficult to look at fiscal policy in terms simultaneously of fiscal discipline (budgetary 
balances) and of the contribution of fiscal policy to growth and employment (composition of 
the budget). In addition, it often appears that the policy guidelines have a limited influence on 
national budgets or on the priorities for the EU budget. 
Second, the procedural and numerical rules which aim at ensuring fiscal discipline as an 
instrument for higher growth and stability have shown shortcomings. The framework lacks 
both incentives for prudent behaviour in good times and rewards for countries with sound 
underlying budgetary positions. In some cases, the framework has not been stringent enough. 
As a consequence, some countries have not reduced their debt level as fast as expected at the 
start of EMU, while others have moved back to deficit levels above those required for 
adopting the euro. The strict timetable and conditions spelled out by the SGP concerning the 
excessive deficit procedure have proven to be complex to implement.  
These developments showed that both the framework which applies to the conduct of national 
fiscal policies and the processes underlying the coordination of economic policies in the EU 
need to be reassessed. Making the EMU macroeconomic framework more effective would 
contribute to progress towards the objective of higher growth. In this endeavour, the right 
balance has to be found between the need to keep the economic governance framework stable 
and predictable and to improve the system on the basis of past experience.  
Various parts of the Report on Public Finances in EMU - 2004 deal with these issues, without 
being either conclusive or exhaustive.  
First, the economic arguments presented above show that, by fostering discipline and quality 
in public finances, the Treaty – with its numerical and procedural rules – does make an 
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important contribution to growth while allowing room for a proper implementation of the 
Lisbon strategy.  
Second, as the Commission has put forward in its communication on Financial Perspectives, 
the BEPGs could assume a more prominent role in economic policy coordination by 
providing better fiscal guidance to Member States, therefore supporting the conduct of 
national policies and the definition of budgets. One possibility could be to bring the national 
budgetary policy coordination calendars more into line with the general policy coordination 
cycle, for example by having an EU six-month period in which policy guidance would be 
formulated and issued followed by a national six-month period during which Member States 
would follow up. This would also make it possible to set fiscal policy in the broader context 
of increasing growth potential and addressing the quality and sustainability of public finances. 
Third, in its Communication of November 2002, the Commission already expressed the 
importance of improving the interpretation of the fiscal rules, in order to take debt 
developments and country-specific circumstances more into account. The Report on Public 
Finances in EMU - 2004 examines several options such as: taking more account of growth 
developments, in particular of protracted slowdowns, in the implementation of the procedures, 
including in the application of the deficit criterion and in setting the deadlines for correcting 
the excessive deficit; and increasing the focus on debt in the surveillance of budgetary 
developments. The Report also elaborates on the concept, put forward in the Public Finances 
Report 2001, of reworking the definition of the medium-term objective for fiscal policy, to 
cater for other (country-specific) circumstances and consider debt levels and the overall 
sustainability of public finances while ensuring that deficits remain below 3% of GDP in 
normal circumstances. It reviews other options to improve the functioning of the SGP such as 
strengthening the incentives to conduct prudent and symmetric-over-the-cycle policies and 
achieve surpluses in good times, or ensuring early action to correct inadequate developments. 
The report indicates that improving the knowledge of government budgetary positions – 
through the analysis of all elements which underlie borrowing requirements and balance 
sheets and through a reinforcement of the statistical framework – also appears to be 
important. For the credibility and smooth operation of the fiscal framework, the reliability of 
fiscal statistics is crucial. To this end, it highlights the importance of strong monitoring of the 
quality of reported fiscal data and of consistency between the status and prerogatives of 
national statistical authorities and their task of ensuring the reliability and timeliness of 
statistics. To this end the Council Conclusions of 2 June 2004 lay down minimum European 
standards for the institutional set-up of statistical authorities. Full transparency will allow the 
financial markets to better assess the creditworthiness of the different Member States. 
Finally, the Report addresses issues of enforcement at both Community and national level. At 
Community level, it recalls the advantages of clarifying the authority and the instruments 
entrusted respectively to the Commission and to the Council. The Commission’s role in 
assessing developments and determining policy recommendations contributes to efficiency. A 
better articulation and differentiation of roles in the application of the SGP resulting from 
changes agreed in the European Constitution (such as the capacity of the Commission to issue 
formal “early warning” directly and to adopt proposals for the Council decisions launching 
the excessive deficit procedure) is an important first step. The report recalls the merits of the 
Community’s, and in particular the Commission’s, power to effectively monitor the 
application of the fiscal rules by Member States, especially concerning the preventive element 
of the framework. At national level, it underlines the importance that Member States ensure 
that institutions are appropriate to the task of ensuring sustainable public finances. This 
involves both improving budgetary procedures and favouring the dialogue among all actors 
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concerned. In this context the role played in some Member States by national counterparts for 
the monitoring function fulfilled by the Commission at EU level appears relevant. 
The Commission will build on the analysis presented in this Report and proceed with 
consultations, with the objective to moving towards specific formal proposals for rejuvenating 
the SGP and strengthening economic governance. 
 
